Take long-term repressive governments; mix in a populace frustrated by economic stagnation, a youth bulge, knowledge of nonviolent strategies, and access to the internet. Voila! You’ve got yourself a nonviolent democratic revolution.

This oversimplified analysis of Tunisia and Egypt has been tempered by the events in Libya and Bahrain. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of popular hype about the leveling power of the internet and the potential use of social networking sites to promote nonviolent revolutions.

Because I have been traveling to Myanmar (called Burma by many who do not live there) since 2008, I have been asked, “Is Burma next? Can what happened in Egypt be accomplished in Burma?” For many reasons, I think Myanmar is not next. Furthermore, I believe that a similar uprising in that country would be disastrous. But that is another issue for another posting. Right now I want to focus on Myanmar/Burma as an illustration of the way the internet can actually work against developing more participatory governing systems.

In the past few decades the planet has been enveloped in increasingly dense networks of communication technology we call the internet. A map of the internet is quite beautiful, and the power of the internet to connect individuals at great distances and to assist in the formation of like-minded groups of individuals for the purpose of advocacy is well documented. Tech savvy members of the Burma exile community were pioneers in using the internet – starting with e-mail and listserv – to organize advocacy campaigns. They now run one of the most sophisticated networks of internet-based advocacy organizations in the world.

While there are elements of dissent and disagreement in that network, by and large they uphold a simple narrative: Aung San Suu Kyi (who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991) and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have heroically resisted the domination of a military government that they describe as one of the most brutal and repressive in the world. It is a classic good versus evil narrative.

And it has worked. Using this narrative and their access to the internet the Burma exile community has managed to capture the policy apparatus in the United States, the United Kingdom, most of Europe and Australia. The resulting imposition of a very tight sanctions on the regime has further isolated the 55 million people living inside the country, which was renamed Myanmar. The people with the greatest knowledge of what is happening inside the country they call Myanmar occupy one of the identified “black holes” of the internet. Consequently, their stories are largely unknown, and outsiders typically see the story of Burma/Myanmar through the frame narrative promoted by the Burma exile community.

At this point the two largest threats to the internet in Myanmar are those elements in the government (note: not the whole government) that fear the outside world and hackers associated with the exile community. When you live in the country it feels as though the fearful elements of the government and the exile community take turns bringing down the internet. In their shared fear of change, these “enemies” are actually cooperating to silence 55 million people so that the world cannot hear their stories directly.

But things are changing. The country is now loosely tethered to the internet. Current estimates are that 400,000 residents of Myanmar have regular access to the internet and demand for access is outstripping capacity. Furthermore, the growing business community interested in connecting to the global economy is pressing for more reliable and robust connection to the internet. When the internet is brought down either by elements of the government or the exile community, both exploiting lack of redundancy in the system, the business community and the activists trying to bring greater citizen involvement to the governance process are equally frustrated.

Many people inside the country do see change. Many of them are working hard to develop a home-grown form of government capable of handling the very complex issues that face their country. Change is coming. The news of that change may or may not reach the outside world thanks to the domination of the internet story of Burma/Myanmar by exiles and their allies.

Read more: – by Jim Della-Giacoma, GlobalPost

[Jayne Seminare Docherty, PhD, is Professor of Leadership and Public Policy at ��ݮ����’s Center for Justice and Peacebuilding. In the spring 2011 semester, she is teaching and . At the upcoming 2011 , she will be teaching .]

Most people agree that the U.S. health care system is broken. Almost nobody in Congress says it works well the way it is. Physicians and other health-care providers aren’t happy. The insurance companies aren’t. Those without health insurance are at serious risk if they require major medical care. The fortunate ones with good insurance may lose it for a variety of reasons, including changes in employment.

So why can’t representatives of the interested, concerned parties simply sit down and negotiate their way to a reasonable solution?

The poor record of health care negotiations points to the limitations of “principled negotiation” practice – i.e., looking for the win-win solution – as it has developed since the 1981 publication of Getting to Yes by Roger Fisher and William Ury.

In May 2008, I joined a group of 50 negotiation educators and practitioners from around the world in Rome, Italy, to examine the limitations of current negotiation practice and to seek ways of improving negotiation training.* We spent two days watching our colleagues teach a basic negotiation training course and another two days rethinking both content and teaching methods. Our goal was to develop version 2.0 of the standard negotiation course, with special attention to matters of culture and context.

I spent most of the four days with a U.S. Army Major serving his third tour in Iraq, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer with a UN peacekeeping background, an Israeli crisis negotiator, and some scholars interested in high-risk negotiations. My own work centers on improving the use of negotiation for ending civil wars and rebuilding post-war societies, with a current focus on Burma/Myanmar and Lebanon.

You might ask, “What do negotiators working in war zones have to teach negotiators working on health care reform in the United States?” Actually, in both cases, the parties are simultaneously negotiating a specific problem, while trying to re-negotiate their social, political, and economic relationships. When you look closely at the health care negotiations, the biggest problems are not technical; they are tied to our (mostly unspoken) sense that we need to re-negotiate fundamental assumptions about how our collective lives are organized.

Difficult questions come into play: Is health care a basic human right? What is the legitimate role of profit making in health care delivery? How do we allocate scarce resources? What responsibilities do individuals have to promote their own wellness? What is the role of government in our personal lives? Any significant changes in the status quo involve enticing millions to change their behaviors and attitudes about health care.

Just as “principled negotiation” is not a robust enough tool for negotiating peace with justice in Iraq, Burma or Bosnia, it is not adequate for negotiating health care reform in the United States. Over the next few years, my colleagues and I will continue to meet and work at drawing negotiation lessons from actual peacebuilding practice. These lessons may arrive too late to affect health-care bills currently being negotiated, but I think they will have surprising applicability to negotiating other public policy issues in the United States including, perhaps, the adjustments we will all have to make in response to global climate change.

A second meeting was held in Istanbul on Oct. 14-17, 2009. See Rethinking Negotiation Teaching: Innovations for Context and Culture edited by Christopher Honeyman, James Coben, and Giuseppe De Palo and Negotiation Journal, April 2009, for the first papers from this multi-year project.

is professor of conflict studies at EMU and author of (Good Books, 2005).